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ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORE 
OF BALANCED GAMES 
ANTON STEFANESCU 
The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involv-
ing several coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. In the general framework of NTU 
games, the uniform competitive solutions have been denned in two earlier papers of the 
author (Stefanescu [5]) and Stefanescu [6]). The general existence results cover most situ-
ations formalized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when 
the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values. 
The present approach concerns the situation when the coalition configurations are bal-
anced. One shows, that if the coalitional function has nonempty values, the game admits 
balanced u.c.s. To each u.c.s. one associated an "ideal payoff vector" representing the utili-
ties that the coalitions promis to the players. One proves that if the game is balanced, then 
the core and the strong core consist of the ideal payoff vectors associated to all balanced 
u.c.s. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As usual in the cooperative game theory a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is 
represented as a pair (N, V), where iV = { l , 2 , . . . - n } i s the set of the players and V 
is the coalitional function defined on the family of all coalitions, 2N. For V we adopt 
one of the commonly used representations; if C G 2 N , then V(C) is a subset of the 
|C|-dimensional Euclidean space, denoted by Rc. Any element of the set V(C) is 
referred to as a C-effective payoff. An iV-effective payoff will be also referred to as 
a feasible payoff. 
Some special notations will be used in the following. For any vector x = (x\,... , 
xn) e R , xc = (xi)iec stands for its projection onto R
c, and for any subset 
A C RNj one denotes pvcA = {xc | x G A} (when C = {i}, then we will write, 
simply, pr^A) If a; and y are two vectors of the same dimension, then x > y means 
Xi > yi for all i\ x > y means x > y but x ^ y, and x 3> y means Xi > yi for all i. 
Turning back to the formal definition of a game, note that almost everywhere in 
the literature, V(C) is described as the set of all vectors representing utilities that 
the coalition C can guarantee for its members. Particularly, this means that any such 
vector can be achieved by a suitable play. Since it is hard to believe that a particular 
coalition can determine a game output and the grand coalition cannot do it, then we 
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are forced to consider that if x G V(C) then x must have an extension in V(N), i. e., 
x G f>TcV(N). In view of this fact, a quite natural property for cooperative game is 
expressed by the following definition: 
Definition 1. The coalitional function V (the game (TV, V) ) is pseudo-monotonic 
if V(C) C VTCV(N) for every C G 2
N. 
2. BALANCED UNIFORM COMPETITIVE SOLUTIONS 
A uniform competitive solution is basically a stable set of proposals involving several 
coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. For proposals we adopt the definition 
in [4]. 
Definition 2. A proposal of the game (1V, V) is any pair (x,C), where C G 2N 
andxeV(C)ripTcV(N). 
Denote by V(N, V) the set of all proposals of the game (1V, V). 
Intuitively, a proposal is an offer that a coalition can make for its members. The 
associated payoff is effective for the coalition and, at the same time it must be 
extended up to a feasible payoff, that is, it actually can be achieved by the players 
if the grand coalition will be formed. 
R e m a r k 1. If the game is pseudo-monotonic then the meaning of this notion 
basically reduces to that of C-effectiveness. 
In the general framework of NTU games, the uniform competitive solutions have 
been defined in [5]. A weaker version of this notion first appears in [6]. 
Let us consider a finite collection of proposals, /C ={(xc,C)\C G C}, where C C 
2^\{0} covers N, i.e. UcecC = N. 
Definition 3. K is a uniform competitive solution (u.c.s.) if it satisfies the follow-
ing two conditions: 
x? = xf , whenever i G C f)Di for any two coalitions C, D G C (1) 
and 
(u, S) G V(N, V), uSnc > 4 c >
 f o r s o m e C eC=>xf >m (2) 
for some D eC and j G S H D. 
Weakening the second condition one obtains a new variant: 
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Definition 4. AC is a weakly uniform competitive solution (w.u.cs.) if it satisfies 
(1) and 
(u, S) G V(N, V), usnc » ^snc
 f o r s o m e c eC^xf >ut 
w) 
for some D eC and j G S D D. 
The basic ideas in the above definitions are to ensure that any (weakly) u.cs. is 
a stable proposal-configuration. 
This stability has two components: the internal stability and the external stabil-
ity. The internal stability requires by (1) that each player has identical preferences 
for the offers coming from different coalitions when he is a potential member of them. 
Therefore, there are no objections from inside. 
The external stability expressed in two variants by (2) and, (corresponding to 
the weaker version of the Pareto principle) by (3), says that no coalition outside 
the solution can threaten the existing configuration, because there does not exist a 
coalition which can make its members better off. 
The main motivation of these solution-concepts is the emptiness of the core. If 
the grand coalition is not able to propose a non-object able output, a u.cs. proposes 
a selection of outputs for the negotiation process. All players support, in some 
sense, these proposals, because each player is member of at least one coalition in 
the configuration. Likewise in the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the 
players should choose finally only one of these proposals, but a precise prediction is 
impossible. 
The u.cs. have also some interesting properties of rationality type. Any solution 
is coalitionally-rational as it immediately follows from the definitions. 
Proposition 2.1. If/C ={(xc,C)\C G C} is a u.cs. (w.u.cs.), then xc is a Pareto 
optimum (weakly Pareto optimum) of V(C) H prcV(N), for every C G C. 
Remark 2. For pseudo-monotonic games the coalitional rationality says that every 
coalition involved in a solution offers to its members an optimum effective payoff. 
The usual meaning of the individual rationality is that each player should receive 
at least the best utility he can obtain himself. In the present framework, we define 
the individually-rational payoff level of the player i G N by: 
( supV({i})npriV(N), i f V ( { i } ) # 0 
Vl~{ - c o , if V({i}) = 0. 
Now, let us associate to each u.cs. (w.u.cs.) a utility vector w of components: 
W{ = xf, whenever i G C G C. 
By (2) w is well-defined. Call it the ideal payoff vector associated to /C. Obviously, 
the ith component of w is exactly the utility promised to the player i by all coalitions 
of C where he is a potential member. 
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Proposit ion 2.2. If w is the ideal payoff vector associated to the u.cs. (w.u.cs.) 
/C, then 
Wi > Vi, for all i G N. 
In summary, each u.cs. (w.u.cs.) is individually-rational because it predicts 
to each player a utility not less than the one he can guarantee for himself, and 
coalitionally-rational because each coalition directly involved can offer to its members 
an optimal effective payoff. 
As it was proved in [6], the general existence results cover most situations for-
malized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when 
the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values. For the classical formal-
ism, when the values of V are nonempty, one can point out the existence of u.cs. 
(w.u.cs.) with a special structure. An interesting situation occurs when the coalition 
configurations are balanced. 
We recall that a collection of coalitions C C 2N is said to be balanced if there 
exists the non-negative weights r e , C G C , such that YsCeC(i) rc — 1? f° r every 
i G N, where C(i) = {C G C\i G C}. 
Definition 5. The u.cs. (w.u.cs.) /C = {(xc,C)\C G C} is said to be balanced if 
C is balanced. 
Obviously, if K is balanced and (rc)cec 1s any system of weights associated to 
C, then the ideal payoff vector associated to /C may be also defined by: 
Wi = ^2 rCwF> i € N. 
cec(i) 
We will show that within the general framework of this section, every game sat-
isfying the following five axioms: 
(Ai) nonemptiness: V(C) ^ 0 & C ^ 0. 
(A2) closedness: V(C) is closed in Rc, for every C. 
(A3) boundedness: For every C the set {x G Rc\x G V(C),Xi > bi, Vi G C} is 
bounded, where b{ = sup V({i}), i G N. 
(A4) comprehesiveness: For every C, if x G V(C) and y < x for some y G Rc', 
then j / 6 V ( C ) . 
(A5) pseudo-monofconicifcy: V is pseudo-monotonic, 
admits balanced w.u.cs. 
If, the following additional condition 
(A6) For any e > 0, S C JV, x G V(5) and i G 5, there exists y G V(5) such that 
jft = Xi - s, and j/j > Xj for all J G 5 \ {i} 
is also fulfilled, then the game has balanced u.cs. 
On the Structure of the Core of Balanced Games 43 
Basically, the above condition states that, within the set of effective payoffs of 
a given coalition, it is always possible to improve the utility of other players if one 
player accepts to diminish his own utility. 
To prove the existence results one can use the arguments in the compact proof 
of Scarf's theorem concerning the non-emptiness of the core for balanced games. In 
fact, removing the balancedness condition, several proofs of this theorem known in 
the literature, represent direct proofs of the existence of balanced w.u.cs. (see for 
instance [1], Theorem 1.5.9., or [3], Theorem 5.4.1.) For the sake of the completeness 
let us sketch the proof and refer the reader to the cited papers. 
T h e o r e m 2.3. Assume (IV, V) satisfy (Ai) - (A 5 ) . Then, it admits a balanced 
w.u.cs. 
P r o o f . Note first that if (Ai), (A2) and (A3) are satisfied, then bi G V({i}), for 
every i G IV. ^ 
Put, for every C C TV, V(C) = {u G V(C)\u{ > bu Vi G C}, and define a new 
NTU game (IV, V ) by V(C) = {x G Rc\x < u, for some u G V(C)}, C C IV. One 
can easily verify that (N,V) satisfies (A2), (A4) and 
(A3) For each C C IV, there exists some constant Mc such that Xi < Mc, for all 
i G C, whenever x G V(C). 
Note that V(C) may be empty for some C, but V({i}) ^ 0 for all i G IV. 
Let C be any covering of IV, and w G RN. Show that the pair (w, C ) represents 
a w.u.cs. of (JV, V) if and only if 
wceV(C), VCeC (4) 
and 
There are no S C IV and u G V^S), such that u > ws- (5) 
Assume first that K is a solution in (N, V) and let w be the ideal payoff vector. 
Then, w{ > bu for all i G IV. Hence, wc G V(C) C V(C), for all C G C. If u » ws 
for some S and u G V(S), one contradicts the definition of K since u G V(S), and 
by pseudo-monotonicity it follows that (u, S) is a proposal in (N, V). 
For the converse implication observe that wc G V(C) C prcV(N), so that (x
c, C) 
is a proposal, where xc = wc- Then K = {(xc\C)\C G C} is a u.cs. Otherwise, 
w S> ^ 5 , for some proposal (u,S). But (5) says that W{ > b{ for every i G iV, so that 
ii G V'(5). One contradicts (5). 
Now we can prove the theorem showing that there exist a balanced collection C 
and w G RN verifying (4) and (5). 
For any subset B of an Euclidean space, int B and dB will designate the interior, 
respectively, the boundary of B. 
We can assume that 0 G 'mtV(S), whenever V(S) ^ 0 (otherwise, one replaces 
V by an appropriate "translation" which satisfies the same properties as V.) Then, 
as a consequence of (A3) one can find a positive constant 6, such that 
xi < 5, for all i G 5, whenever x G V(S), for some S C IV. (6) 
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Consider the set 
w = [UCCN{X G R
N\xc e V(C)}] n (-00,S]
n (7) 
The next six statements are proved in [1]. 
1. Let A the (n-l)-dimensional standard simplex. Then, for any s G A there 
exists a unique a > 0 such that as G dW. 
2. The function / : A -> dW H .R+, defined by f(s) = as is continuous. 
3. The correspondence \£ : A -» 2 A , defined by 
*(s) = {±ec\CCNJ(s)eV'(C)} . 
where, ec G RN 
6 i ~~ \ 0, if t £ C 
is closed and non-empty valued. 
4. The correspondence s -» co\£(s), (coJ5 stands for the convex hull of B ) is 
closed with non-empty and convex values. 
5. The correspondence $ : A x A -> 2 A x A , defined by $(s , t) = {0(s,£)}xco\I>(s), 
where 
/ ^ i 5* + max{0, U - 1/n} \ 
k! + EjeN max{0, ^ - 1/n} J . ^ ' 
admits fixed points (it satisfies all assumptions of the Kakutani's fixed point theo-
rem). 
6. Let (s,t) any fixed point of $ . Denote by w = f(s). Then, the collection 
of coalitions C(w) = { C C N\wc G ^ ' (C)} is balanced. Particularly, (10, C(-u;)) 
satisfies (4). 
Now we can easily show that w also satisfies (5). To the contrary, assume that 
there exists S C N and u G V'(S) such that u 2> ws- Extend u up to u G J R N , by 
{ u;, if ieS _ J, if t 6 S. 
By (4) and (6) one has Wi < S for all i e N. Hence, w <S u. Since T£ G W> then 
ty G int W, in contradiction with / ( s ) G 9VV. • 
The existence of a balanced u.c.s. can be also proved. 
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Theorem 2.4. Assume (N,V) satisfy (Ai) - (A 6 ) . Then, it admits a balanced 
u.c.s. 
P r o o f . We can show that (A6) implies that any w.u.c.s. is a u.c.s. too. 
Let us assume that w is the ideal payoff vector associated to a w.u.c.s. /C, but 
there exists a proposal (u, 5) , such that u > ws- Suppose that Ui — Wi = e > 0, for 
some i G S. Then, by (A6 ) there exists y G V(S) such that yi = u\ - § > wi, and 
Vj > Uj > Wj, for j € S\{i}. Thus, y > ws, a contradiction. • 
3. THE CORE AND THE STRONG CORE OF A BALANCED GAME 
By its classical definition, the core C(N, V) of the game (TV, V) consists of all non-
dominated feasible utility vectors, i.e. 
C(N,V) = {ue V(N)\C G 2N,u' eRc,u'^uc^u' i V(C)}. 
Strengthening the non-domination condition we define the strong core: 
SC(N,V) = {ue V(N)\C G 2N,u' G Rc , u' >uc^u' i V(C)}. 
The general relationships between the core and uniform competitive solutions 
have been established in [5]. 
The proofs of the next two propositions are straightforward. 
Proposition 3.1. If u G C(N, V), then {(u, N)} is a w.u.c.s. 
Proposit ion 3.2. If u G SC(N, V), then {(u, N)} is a u.c.s. 
Now, we can show that if the game is balanced (i.e. {u G R \uc G V(C), 
VC G C} C V(N) whenever C is balanced), then the ideal payoff vector of any 
balanced w.u.c.s. (u.c.s) belongs to the core (strong core). Thus we have, 
Theorem 3.3. Let (N, V) a balanced game satisfying (Ai)-(A4). Then, the 
core C(1V, V) is nonempty and consists of all ideal payoff vectors associated to the 
balanced w.u.c.s. 
P r o o f . Note that the pseudo-monotonicity of V is used in the proof of Theorem 
2.3 only to show that if (w,C) verifies (4), then each pair ( x c , C ) , where xc = wc 
for C G C, is a proposal of the game (iV, V). If the game is balanced, this conclusion 
trivially follows if C is balanced. Or, by statement 6 of the proof it is claimed that 
there exists w such that (w, C(w)) represents a w.u.c.s. and C(w) is balanced. Hence, 
by Theorem 2.3 any balanced game satisfying (Ai)-(A4) admits balanced w.u.c.s. 
Moreover, if w is the ideal payoff vector associated to any balanced w.u.c.s., then 
w G V(N). Since it satisfies (5) with respect to V, it results that w G C(N, V). Then 
the proof is completed by Proposition 3.1. • 
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Theorem 3.4. Let (.A/", V) a balanced game satisfying (Ai) - (A4) and (Ae). Then, 
the strong core SC(N, V) is nonempty and consists of all ideal payoff vectors asso-
ciated to the balanced u.c.s. 
P r o o f . As in the above, using Theorem 2.4 and Proposition 3.2. • 
The above results highlight the structure of the core (strong core) of a balanced 
game. It appears that every utility vector of the core is supported by a balanced 
configuration of coalitions. Moreover, this configuration is stable in the sense of the 
definitions of uniform competitive solutions. 
On the other hand, by the existence theorems of the previous section, (weakly) 
uniform competitive solutions exists for a wide category of games. Therefore, the set 
of ideal payoff vectors associated to all balanced w.u.c.s. (u.c.s.) can be considered 
as an extension of the concept of core. 
(Received March 20, 2000.) 
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